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Abstract
The present study examines the role of a specific instruction designed to guide jurors on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in determining sentence recommendation. To date, there is no
research examining whether specific instructions provide more guidance, and improve jurors’
discretion compared to the current general instructions. We predicted that specific mitigating
instructions would increase confidence in life sentencing compared to generic instructions as
well as revised instructions. We also predicted that expert testimony of childhood physical abuse
would minimize death penalty recommendations. Contrary to our predictions, we found that
exposure to generic instructions increased confidence in a life sentence. In addition, perceptions
of the defendant and mood predicted confidence in sentence. Positive mood predicted high levels
of confidence in a death sentence.
Keywords: mitigating circumstances, capital trial, sentencing instructions
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Considering Constitutionally Relevant Evidence:
An Assessment of Childhood Physical Abuse as a Non-Statutory Mitigating Circumstance
Capital Sentencing Scheme
In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled all death penalty
statutes acknowledging that under the current guidelines the death penalty was imposed in a
capricious, indiscriminate manner, thus violating the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment (Latzer, 1998, Palmer, 1998, Ogloff & Chopra, 2004). Four years later
in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court revised the death penalty statutes. The revised statutes
addressed the arbitrariness as characterized by the pre-Furman era by bifurcating the capital trial.
During the sentencing phase, jurors’ attention is shifted from factual evidence presented in the
guilty phase towards the specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the
capital offense (Haney, 2005, Kelly, 1992). Aggravating circumstances render the death sentence
more appropriate and mitigating circumstances render a life sentence as more appropriate
(Haney, 2005, Sandys, Pruss & Walsh, 2009). The intention of the presentation of each set of
circumstances was to guide jurors’ judgments in considering sentence recommendation.
In the present study, we examine how jurors perceive evidence of childhood physical
abuse in the context of a capital sentencing hearing. Although constitutionally relevant, this type
of mitigating evidence has the potential to act as an aggravating circumstance, thus rendering the
death sentence as more appropriate than a life sentence. In addition, we expect that the method
utilized by the Court to present this type of evidence also has the potential to interact with
sentence preference. We propose that the current method of including all mitigating evidence of
the same nature in one category (catchall instruction) is insufficient and propose a more efficient
method of presenting each factor separately to the jury. This method is consistent with the US
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Supreme Court’s expectations that guided discretion would increase fairness in the sentencing
hearing (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976).
Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Sentencing
Aggravating circumstances. Reasoning that the penalty of death is qualitatively different
from any other sentence (Furman v. Georgia, 1972) and in an effort to secure the
constitutionality of the capital procedure, a defendant is only qualified for a death sentence when
the jury unanimously decides that the state has proven at least one aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt against him (Brown v. Sanders, 2006, Zant v. Stephens, 1983).
Aggravating statutory circumstances are constitutionally permissible when they are specific to
the case, and when they are set out in a clear and understandable manner (Tuilaepa v. California,
1994). They constitute irrefutable factual evidence dependent on the guilty phase of the capital
trial, such as those reliant on the criminal offense (i.e., murder during the context of another
crime: e.g., robbery, burglary, kidnapping), type of victim (correction officer, law enforcement
officer, judge) and others including multiple homicides, heinousness of the crime, and a previous
conviction of murder (Palmer, 1998). Aggravating circumstances must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and must agreed upon unanimously by jury members (Turlington, 2008).
Apart from the enumerated statutory aggravating circumstances, there are also nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, which neither prove a statutory aggravating circumstance
nor qualify a defendant for a death sentence. Their existence however, can heavily support the
imposition of a death penalty verdict (Palmer, 1998; Turlington, 2008). Among the non-statutory
aggravating circumstances a jury is allowed to consider consist of: lack of remorse (State v.
Hargrove, 1991, State v. Parker, 1985), evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts (State v.
Forrest, 2006) and victim impact evidence (Payne v. Tennessee, 1991). Victim impact evidence
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is the tool most commonly employed by the prosecutor in the penalty phase of the capital trial,
and aims to divert juror’s attention from the defendant and the circumstances of the offense
toward the victim and the pain inflicted by his death (Booth v. Maryland, 1987). Tsoudis and
Smith- Lovin (1998) found that when jurors were exposed to victim impact statement in the
context of a robbery they rendered more punitive verdicts. The prejudicial nature of this type of
non-statutory evidence impedes the juror decision-making process (Myers & Greene, 2004,
Salerno & Bottoms, 2009) and discourages the consideration of key aspects of the defense. The
rationale seems to be that the more jurors identify themselves with the victim the more they
distance themselves from the defendant (Nussbaum, 2001).
Mitigating circumstances. Although the concept of mitigation was central in the Gregg
decision, it wasn’t until 1978 (Lockett v. Ohio), that the court ruled that “the sentencer in all but
the rarest kind of the capital case not be precluded from considering, as mitigating factor, any
aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death” (p. 864). Unlike aggravating factors
where capital jurisdictions demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the majority of capital
punishment jurisdictions rule that mitigating circumstances must only be proven to the juror’s
satisfaction. According to Haney (1995), mitigating evidence is not intended to excuse, justify,
or diminish the significance of what the defendants have done, but to help explain it in a manner
that provides guidance and relevance to capital jurors’ decision-making. A majority of capital
jurisdictions have created a list of statutory mitigating factors among which include: the
circumstances of the crime, the absence of significant criminal history, mental or emotional
disturbance which resulted in diminished capacity to conform with the conducts of the law,
whether the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
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person, the age of the defendant at the time of offense, whether the defendant was an accomplice
to the offence, victim participation or consent, intoxication, and character and background of the
defendant (Acker & Lanier, 1994).
In addition to statutory mitigating circumstances, most statutes include a specific list of
statutory mitigators. In accordance with the Lockett decision, they provide an additional catchall
instruction, which directs juries in considering as mitigating any other relevant evidence
presented by the defense not listed in the sentencing instruction. The catchall instruction includes
a cluster of non-defined character and background evidence referred to as non-statutory
mitigating evidence. This evidence includes: childhood abuse (Penry v. Lynaugh, 1989),
evidence of difficult family history and emotional disturbance (Eddings v. Oklahoma, 1982),
post-crime evidence related to well adjustment and good behavior in jail (Skipper v. South
Carolina, 1986). In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) for example, the sentence of death was ruled
unconstitutional as the judge refused to take non-statutory mitigating factors into consideration
and instead he instructed the jury to consider only those enlisted by the state statute. Even though
statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances are of equal paramount importance from a
constitutional standpoint, juries are guided towards that challenging and unfamiliar concept only
through a broad and vague catchall instruction. This becomes a serious issue considering that in
most cases the defense rests in whole or part on non-statutory mitigating circumstances (Ellman,
1986).
In Boyde v. California (1990), it was argued that California’s catchall mitigation
instruction, which directs jurors to consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime”, precluded jurors from
considering evidence of the defendant’s background and character, giving rise to only crime-
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related evidence. The judge in Boyde ruled that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury
felt precluded by the catchall instruction from considering mitigating evidence related to the
offender’s background and character. As a result, the decision applied the same standard as an
earlier case (Buchanan v. Angelone, 1998) - the sentencing Court did not constitutionally erred
by telling jurors to reach a death verdict by considering all the evidence without providing any
further instruction on mitigation. In other words, a death penalty jury does not have to be given
specific instructions by the judge on mitigating factors. The court upheld the constitutionality of
the catchall instruction in Ayers v. Belmontes (2006), when the trial judge refused to specifically
enumerate non-statutory mitigating evidence consisting of the defendant’s ability to be a
productive individual, survive in a structured setting, and used good adjustment while
incarcerated (Williams, 2006). Legal scholars have criticized the catchall instruction for its lack
of explicitness (Turlington, 2008). The notion is that the catchall instruction lacks the specific
guidance offered through the presentation of the circumstances in a list as in statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. To date there are no studies that examine the alleged
superiority of the catchall instruction over specifically enumerated non-statutory mitigating
circumstances. In the present study, we will examine the relative efficacy of a generic catchall
instruction versus a specific non-statutory instruction on capital jurors’ sentencing decisions. It is
expected that presenting a specific list of non-statutory mitigating circumstances will lead to
decreased penalty recommendation compared to the state approved catchall instruction.
Finally, the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances differs across
jurisdictions, with some requiring that statutory aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances either by a preponderance of evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, and others
requiring that mitigating outweigh aggravating, and still others not requiring weighing mitigating
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and statutory aggravators at all (Palmer, 1998). Consequently, capital sentencing juries must be
allowed to weigh mitigating evidence independently, as opposed to unanimously, mitigating
evidence including character, background information, or any other circumstances that renders
the death sentence less appropriate (Jurek v. Texas, 1976). Only in this manner, will a capital
defendant receive a fair and impartial sentencing hearing.
Capital Defense Counsel, Mitigating Evidence and Expert Testimony
The movement towards individualizing the sentencing process has necessitated the
presence of re-examining how mitigating evidence is utilized in the sentencing phase and has
highlighted the role of defense counsel in presenting such evidence (Kelly, 1992). The Court in
Williams v. Taylor (2000) as well as Wiggins v. Smith (2003) reversed the capital defendant’s
death sentence on the grounds that their attorneys did not fulfill their obligation to effectively
assist their client. The specific reasons included failing to investigate mitigating evidence of the
defendant’s childhood abuse, neglect, and severe mental problems that could have potentially
impacted jurors’ appraisals of his moral culpability. That said, defense counsel has the duty to
investigate and obtain mitigating evidence, even when the defendant and his/her family state the
unavailability of mitigating evidence (Rompilla v. Beard, 2005).
A particularly problematic area for the defendant in a capital trial is the order of evidence.
Presenting mitigating testimony at the last stage of the penalty phase creates a difficult
juxtaposition for the jurors. The prosecution presents a plethora of aggravating evidence such as
defendant’s past criminal acts, victim impact evidence and expert testimony on additional
aggravating circumstances (e.g. future dangerousness), before the presentation of mitigation
evidence. This leaves the defense very little latitude in presenting mitigating evidence that could
potentially counterbalance any negative reactions to the presentation of aggravating evidence
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(Haney, 2005). According to research (e.g., Haney & Greene, 2004), jurors enter trial with
preexisting beliefs and attitudes. When these attitudes are negative, the likelihood they will more
readily adopt aggravating evidence increases. As a result, their decisions will be congruent with
the negative emotions inflicted by the prosecutorial narrative in the guilt phase of the trial. Those
beliefs are created and reinforced by the media, which demonize the defendant, depicting their
act as a product of irreversible and inherent personal traits. Importantly, this media blitz, fails to
report information of abusive upbringings and past trauma, often underlying the alleged criminal
offense. Under those circumstances, the defense attorney has a greater burden to meet at capital
trials (Haney, 2005).
A common strategy employed by defense attorneys, is the recruitment of an expert
witnesses who will identify mitigating factors of the case, by thoroughly investigating the
defendant’s childhood, upbringing, school records, medical records, relationships and traumatic
experiences (Goodpaster, 1983). Even though the law does not require a direct connection
between mitigating evidence and the offense (Tennard v. Dratke, 2004), research has found that
such testimony is important to jurors since it provides a context for understanding the criminal
offense (Sundby, 1997). Presenting evidence of the defendant’s troubled life however, is not
enough to invoke empathy on behalf of the juries. This is because they experience difficulty
relating to relatively specific aspects of a capital defendant’s life such as violence, abuse, drugs,
access to weapons, and victimization (Fabian, 2009). In this regard, the fundamental role of
expert testimony is to provide a contextual framework that links the defendant’s criminality with
his/her negative upbringing and depriving social environment. The goal of the expert testimony
in this context is to facilitate deliberation discussion framing the crime in terms of the
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defendant’s life events and also to provide an understanding of why he committed the crime
(Fabian, 2003).
Overall, the influence of expert testimony is related to any number of factors; namely, the
physical appearance of the expert, their credentials, the complexity of the expert testimony,
jurors’ prior beliefs about the case, the specific link between the expert testimony and the facts of
the case, and the confidence portrayed by the expert (Krauss & Sales, 2001). In the current study,
our interest is focused on the presentation of expert testimony of childhood physical abuse. The
next section will describe the role of testimony of abuse on juror decision-making.
Childhood Abuse and the Capital Defendants
Research finds that a great majority of individuals facing capital offenses were raised in
environments deprived of secure attachments, nurturing, protection, and stimulation. Rather, we
find they share a common pattern of childhood trauma and maltreatment (Sarat, 1993).
Recognizing the significant impact of childhood abuse, The US Supreme Court in U.S. v. Rivera
(1999) stated “it seems beyond a question that abuse suffered during childhood – at some level of
severity- can impair a person’s mental and emotional condition” (p. 85). Similarly, in Santosky v.
Krammer (1982), the court stated “it requires no citation of authority to assert that children who
are abused in their youth generally face extraordinary problems developing into responsible,
productive citizens” (p. 673). Indeed there is substantial evidence that supports the notion that
abused children are much more likely to commit crimes as adults compared to individuals
without such an abused past (Haney, 1995; Widom, 1989). Literature on child abuse identifies
possible psychological, physiological and developmental long-term impairments caused by
childhood abuse such as impaired impulse control, poor social skills, self injurious and suicidal
behaviors, poor emotional and behavioral regulation (Malinosky-Rummell & Hansen, 1993).
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This literature states that an individual’s ability to form rational judgments and appreciate
the consequences of his actions is significantly impaired in stressful and threatening situation.
Consequently, he/she is more likely to overreact and engage in inappropriate, aggressive
behaviors. The long term consequences of childhood abuse empowers the mitigating quality of
that factor, providing an important reason for a juror to believe that life imprisonment is more
appropriate for that defendant compared to a death sentence. Despite the fact that expert
testimony will rest solely on providing a context for these impairments, it is equally important
for the expert witness to identify the rehabilitative capacity of the defendant since research finds
that prosecutors will attempt to use impairments as aggravating circumstances: e.g., claiming
either that damage to the defendant is so irreversible that the defendant poses a continuous threat
to the society, or that childhood abuse is not an ‘excuse’ for committing capital murder (Platania
& Small, 2010; Platania & Moran, 1999).
Instructional Confusion: The Presumption of Juror Comprehension
Given the fact that the application of legally faulty instructions is grounds for reversal of
a death sentence, across jurisdictions judges adhere to standardized, pattern instructions. Pattern
instructions are intended to increase juror comprehension of judicial instructions, decrease the
time that judges and lawyers spent drafting instructions for each case, and limit potential biases
among jurists (McBride, 1969). However, literature suggests that pattern instructions have
tragically failed to effectively guide jurors in capital sentencing (Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977,
1982a; Strawn & Buchanan, 1976). In addition, data obtained from the National Assessment of
Adult Literacy (NAAL, 2003) indicate that 29% of adults possess a Basic level of prose literacy.
According to NAAL, prose literacy refers to the knowledge and skills needed to comprehend and
use information from continuous texts, for example, editorials, news stories, and instructional
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materials. Research finds that reading levels associated with instructions significantly surpassed
the reading comprehension abilities of American adults. In addition, legal principles embedded
within the weighing language instruction were significantly more difficult to comprehend
compared to the language describing the aggravating factors component of the instructions
(Platania, Small, & Cutler, 2011). Although the Court reinstated the death penalty with the hope
that specific instructions provided in the sentencing phase will safeguard against the arbitrariness
and capriciousness of the death penalty imposition (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976), research
consistently points to the need for states to re-evaluate the language of capital sentencing
instructions. At issue is the type of instructions intended to facilitate and guide the jury
deliberation. The vast majority of the psycho-legal research has mapped two particularly
problematic areas: poor comprehension of instructions intended to guide them in the legal
threshold of mitigation and aggravation (see Blankenship, Luginbuhl, Cullen & Reddick 1997;
Bowers, 1995; Diamond & Levi, 1996; Luginbuhl, 1992; Luginbuhl & Howe, 1995, Ritter,
2004; Wiener et al., 2004) and poor understanding and evaluation of the concepts of mitigation
and aggravation (Haney & Lynch, 1994; Tiersma, 1995; Stetler, 2008).
Research in the area of instruction comprehension has not gone completely unnoticed by
the Court. For example, one of the first studies to challenge the presumption that jurors
understand instructions (Zeisel, 1991) was dismissed by the 7th Circuit. The Court declared that
the absence of a control group invalidated the data in several post-conviction hearings (Free v.
Peters, 1991; Gacy v. Wellborn, 1993). Diamond and Levi (1996) maintained Zeisel’s format
and replicated the study by revising the pattern instructions and adding a control group. More
specifically, that survey attempted to assess juror understanding of key legal concepts for the
capital sentencing phase such as unenumerated mitigators - particularly jurors’ ability to
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understand that they are allowed to consider as mitigating factor evidence that is not specifically
pinpointed by the judge. In addition, non-unanimity of decisions involving mitigating
circumstances (i.e., independent consideration can be awarded any factor as a mitigator without
unanimous consent) and the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors (i.e., death is
not the only appropriate sentence unless mitigating evidence are sufficient to overcome this
assumption) were also examined. The results of this study yielded the most significant
improvement in comprehension was in the enumeration of the mitigating factors, with the
participant-jurors averaging 58% correct when presented with revised instructions while only
41% when presented with the pattern instructions. The researchers concluded that the better the
jurors comprehend the existence of mitigating factors the less likely it was to vote for the
imposition of the death penalty. Similarly, Luginbuhl (1992) found that when mock jurors were
grappling with concepts of mitigation, their comprehension significantly decreased. Results
specifically indicated that jurors understand un-enumerated mitigators, with over half of the
participant-jurors considering any evidence as mitigating, however, almost half of the
participant-jurors incorrectly believed that mitigating evidence should be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that they should be decided unanimously, concluding that even when
jurors properly considered any evidence as mitigating, there were likely to dismiss them due to
the confusion related to the burden of proof attached to them.
On the other hand, when considering aggravating circumstances, almost half of the
participant-jurors inaccurately considered as aggravating any factor that deemed the crime more
severe. However, more than half correctly understood that an aggravating factor need to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and voted unanimously by the jury. Bentele and Browers
(2001) found that when considering aggravating factors, jurors mistakenly believed that
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establishing the existence of an aggravating factor requires the imposition of death penalty. Otto,
Applegate and Davis (2007) suggested that even by improving the comprehensibility of the
instructions the level of understanding of mitigation still remains under question. Although the
correct responses regarding non-statutory/non-enumerated factors increased with the addition of
a clarification to the pattern instructions, the level of comprehension remained low (58.8% v.
38.1% with pattern instructions only). Along the same lines, Smith and Haney (2001) reported
that despite the significant improvement in compression as a product of instructional
modification, the problematic asymmetry of better identifying aggravation and mitigation was
reflected in the survey’s results.
Addressing the confusion surrounding the terms of mitigation and aggravation, a study
conducted by Haney and Lynch (1994) found that only 8% of college students provided totally
correct definitions for aggravation and mitigation, while 64% of the participant-jurors provided
partially correct definition for aggravation and only 47% for mitigation. In the same study when
participant-jurors were asked to categorize a variety of factors as either mitigating or
aggravating, 36% of them listed the catchall instruction (“any other circumstances appropriate
for consideration”) as aggravating evidence. Overall, the majority of studies have demonstrated
significant improvement in comprehension, when instructions are rewritten or simplified (see
Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1982b; Severance, Greene, & Loftus, 1984;
Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995).
Several empirical studies have assessed the inefficacy of California’s penalty
pattern instructions (Haney & Lynch, 1994, 1997; Lynch, & Haney, 2000, 2009). Haney and
Lynch for example, assessed the comprehensibility of the terms mitigation and aggravation, and
specifically how jurors are evaluating capital trial evidence when they are instructed with
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California’s pattern penalty instruction. California’s pattern instructions have drawn attention by
researchers due to the manner in which they differ from other states’ instructions. First, they fail
to clarify the mitigating or aggravating weight that the jurors should give to the enlisted factors,
and secondly, the vocabulary of the catchall instruction has the potential to be particularly
confusing to jurors (use of the term “extenuating” in relation to the severity of the crime). Keep
in mind that the catchall instruction, although intended to guide jurors in non-statutory
mitigating circumstances such as character evidence, background information and other
circumstances, does not include an enumerated list of circumstances. Rather, non-statutory
mitigating circumstances are presented wholly, usually in the following language: Any other
circumstance, whether related to these charges or not, extenuates the gravity of the crime[s] even
though the circumstance is not a legal excuse or justification (Ayres v. Belmontes, 2006). The
results indicated that jurors exhibited significant difficulty understanding the definition of the
term “extenuates” with more than half interpreting the word as “actually being caught in the
crime without a doubt” with only 3% offering a definition that would suggest the opposite of the
term aggravation. The second alarming finding was that after “victim participated in his own
homicide”, this language was the second most misunderstood by the jurors with 28% identifying
this factor as aggravating rather than mitigating. In the same study, through a content analysis on
the penalty phase attorney arguments for California capital cases, it was revealed that only in 3
out of 10 cases, attorneys correctly redefined in nonrealistic term the instruction provided for the
non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Consistent with those findings, a similar study found that
in 8 out of 10 actual capital trials, jurors dismissed non-criminal background character evidence
when this evidence was not directly related to the nature of the crime (Haney, Sontag &
Costanzo, 1994).
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According to Garvey (1998), the most powerful mitigating circumstances are residual
doubt evidence which is related to the extent to which the defendant is involved in the crime,
followed by reduced culpability factors such as mental retardation (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002), and
age of the defendant (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). Finally, the least powerful evidence were remote
culpability factors which fall in the cluster of non-statutory mitigating circumstances, such as the
defendant having experienced childhood abuse, raised in poverty and never having received help
for his problems. Barnett, Brodsky and Davis (2004) found that jurors were significantly more
likely to vote for a life sentence in the presence of mitigating factors. More specifically, evidence
of mental retardation and major mental illness (schizophrenia) rendered more life sentences
compared to evidence of defendant’s childhood abuse and substance abuse which still yielded
significantly higher portions of life verdicts compared to the condition where mitigating evidence
where absent. In a similar study, Barnett, Brodsky and Price (2007) found that jurors considered
as most mitigating: mentally retardation (64%), hospitalized with a mental illness (41%), no
prior criminal record (40%), major head injuries (37%), schizophrenia (35%), childhood physical
abuse (21%) and childhood sexual abuse (20%). As seen in the literature, childhood physical
abuse possesses rather poor mitigating power, especially in the eyes of death-qualified jurors
who, compared to excludable jurors, are less receptive to mitigating evidence, more receptive to
aggravating, and more likely either to either dismiss childhood abuse evidence or attribute weak
mitigating effect (Butler & Moran, 2002; Butler & Moran, 2007; Luginbuhl & Middendorf,
1988). Although Stalin’s and Henry (1994) found that individuals are more likely to allocate less
punitive sentences to abused offenders compared to non-abused offenders, more recent studies
suggest that jurors perceive specific types of mitigating evidence (childhood abuse and drug
abuse) as aggravating (Barnett, Brodsky & Price, 2007; Brodsky, Adams & Tupling, 2007;
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Garvey, 1998; Logan, 1989). Research has also found rather permanent, irreversible effects for
the defendant (Grisso, 2002). More specifically, Stevenson, Bottoms, and Diamond (2010) found
that in the context of a child abuse history, jurors made more controllable attributions for the
defendant - suggesting that he could have controlled the negative effects of his abuse and that
perhaps he caused his abuse. They also found more stable attributions on the part of the
defendant; i.e., that he/she may be permanently damaged by the abuse. This finding is
particularly disturbing considering that jurors’ perceptions of future dangerousness followed by
lack of remorse is a leading factor in death penalty recommendations (Garvey, 1998).
The Present Study
In the present study we examined the role of a specific instruction designed to guide jurors on
non-statutory mitigating circumstances in determining sentence preference. To date there is no
research examining whether specific instructions provide more guidance, and improve juror
discretion compared to the current general catchall instructions. We expected that specific
mitigating instructions would minimize death penalty recommendations compared to generic
instructions and revised instructions. We also expected that participant-jurors would be less
likely to assign a death sentence when they are presented with expert testimony on the effects of
childhood physical abuse on the defendant compared to the condition where expert testimony is
absent. The instruction condition however, would moderate this effect. Namely, when evidence
of childhood physical abuse is enumerated to jurors in the form of a specific jury instruction,
death penalty recommendations will decrease but only in the expert testimony condition. Finally,
we predict mood would mediate assessments of the defendant and perceptions of trial-specific
factors.
Purpose and Hypothesis
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The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of a specific instruction designed
to guide jurors on non-statutory mitigating circumstances in determining sentence preference.
Jurors are currently directed towards non-statutory mitigating circumstances though a catchall
instruction, which directs them in considering as mitigating any other relevant evidence
presented by the defense not listed in the sentencing instruction. To date there is no research
examining whether specific instructions provide more guidance, and improve juror discretion
compared to the current general catchall instructions. We were interested in examining the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: We predict a moderating effect of instructions on jurors’ confidence in sentence
recommendations. Specifically, when evidence of childhood physical abuse is enumerated to
jurors in the form of a specific jury instruction, death penalty recommendations will decrease but
only in the expert testimony condition. We predict main effects of each factor: Jurors will be
more confident in a life sentence when they are presented with expert testimony on the effects of
childhood physical abuse on the defendant compared to the condition where expert testimony is
absent. Jurors will be more confident in a life sentence when presented with a specific jury
instruction compared to either a generic or revised version of instructions.
Hypothesis 2: We will investigate the effect of our trial factors on jurors’ consideration of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. This investigation is exploratory as this is the first study to
examine the specific set of circumstances chosen in the context of this trial scenario.
Hypothesis 3: We will examine the predictive utility of affect, perceptions of the defendant, and
demographics on confidence in sentence.
Method
Participants

CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE

19

One hundred and eighty-five community members were recruited by StudyResponse
project, hosted by the School of Information Studies at Syracuse University. StudyResponse
exists as a resource for student and faculty researchers in the social sciences. All participantjurors were pre-screened for basic jury eligibility according to the Wainwright v. Witt (1985)
criterion which excludes jurors based on whether their attitudes towards the death penalty
“significantly impairs” their ability to follow the law. After screening the sample consisted of
one hundred and seventy death qualified participant-jurors (90% of sample) and fifteen nondeath qualified participant-jurors (10% of sample) that did not continue with the study.
Demographic characteristics revealed that 51% of the sample were male, and 49% were female
(n = 86 v. 83). Forty-five percent were between the ages of 34 and 44, 88% were Caucasian, 34%
were Catholic, 58% were married, 34% considered themselves slightly conservative, 51%,
served on a jury 70% were employed full time, 61% had a college degree.
Our sample responded to items assessing degree of certainty associated with “reasonable
doubt” and “preponderance of evidence” standards. Alarmingly, we discovered that 55% of
respondents reported the standard used to consider a death sentence as “reasonable doubt; only
38% indicated the “preponderance of evidence” standard in order to consider a life sentence.
Materials
Pre-Trial Materials
Prior to administering the stimulus materials participant-jurors completed the death
qualification status item, twelve items assessing basic demographic information and the
abbreviated versions of the PANAS scale, which measures positive and negative affect.
Trial Materials
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Case materials include the facts of the case, opening statements from both defense and
prosecution, expert testimony, cross examination of the expert testimony, closing statements of
the defense and prosecution and the judge’s instructions on the law that is to be applied to the
facts of the case.
Post-Trial Measures
After the completion of the trial stage participant-jurors completed post-trial measures
consisting of sentence determination (life in prison v. death penalty), items measuring attitudes
related to the trial, quality of the expert testimony, comprehension of the judicial instructions,
assessments of the mitigating factors presented during the trial and mitigating factors considered
in reaching their decision.
Items. Participant-jurors indicated whether they would recommend life in prison or death
by lethal injection by checking a box next to their choice. Then they indicated how certain they
were of their decision using a 7-point Likert scale. The main dependent variable “confidence in
sentencing recommendation” was created by multiplying the sentencing decision (life in prison =
-1, death by lethal injection= +1) with the confidence of their sentencing recommendation
resulting in a scale from (-7= high confidence in life verdict to 7= high confidence in death
verdict). This measure is a common practice in measuring jury decisions (see, e.g., Miller &
Hayward, 2008).
Participant-jurors provided their opinion of the quality of the expert testimony on the
following items: “How credible the expert testimony was in the case?” “How scientific the
expert testimony was in this case?” “How important was the expert testimony to this case?”
Participant-jurors were also asked “How troubled was the defendant’s life?” “To what extent do
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you believe the victims death was a unique loss to his family?” All items were measured on a
Liker-type scale from 1 = Not at all to 8 = Completely.
Participant-jurors completed a series of 7 items on a scale of 0% to 100% measuring the
extent to which trial factors influenced their sentencing decision. Two manipulation checks were
included regarding the defendant (the defendant in this case was: physically abused/sexually
abused/the witness of physical abuse/none of the above) and the expert witness (In this case you
heard evidence presented by an expert witness: Yes/No)
Design and Procedure
We utilized a 2 Expert Testimony (Present v. Absent) x 3 Instructions (Catchall v.
Revised v. Specific) between-subjects factorial design. Participant-jurors were instructed though
a written from that the current study examines jurors’ perceptions of the sentencing phase of a
capital trial and that by participating they would be asked to review a segment of testimony in a
death penalty case and fill out a questionnaire regarding aspects of trial. After participant-jurors
electronically signed the informed consent, they proceeded to the survey where they read the
case summary and the death qualification instruction. The respondents who indicated that they
didn’t find the defendant of the case guilty and that their views on the death penalty (either in
favor or opposed) would prevent or substantially impair them from considering the both
penalties in this case were thanked for their participation and did not continue to the next phase
of the study. Participant-jurors who indicated otherwise proceeded with the study and were
randomly assigned to one of the six conditions, completed the pre-trial instruments, read the trial
materials and completed all the dependent measures. Upon completion of the entire study,
participant-jurors where thanked, debriefed and awarded the $10 research incentive. Participation
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required approximately 30 to 40 minutes depending on the stimulus condition. See Appendix for
copies of all stimulus materials as well as completed Human Subjects Review Board application.
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Results
Manipulation Check
In order to assess the efficacy of our expert testimony independent variable, we measured
participant-jurors’ awareness of the experimental condition to which they were exposed.
Crosstabulation analysis revealed 84% of our participant-jurors reported not hearing from an
expert in the Expert Testimony Absent condition, while 90% of our participant-jurors reported
hearing evidence presented by an expert in the Expert Testimony Present condition.
Scale Reliability and Assessment
Separate reliability analyses were conducted on items indicating positive and negative
affect of the composite PANAS abbreviated 20-item measure. Positive item internal consistency
measured α = .85, negative item internal consistency measured α = .96. As a result, no recoding
was necessary. Perceptions of the expert were measured through a summated rating scale of
items assessing the credibility, importance, and scientific relevance of the expert’s testimony.
Due to the limited number of items, bivariate correlations were observed rather than assessing
Cronbach’s alpha. Inter-item correlations ranged from r = .67 to .80, p < .001 (one-tailed), thus
indicating the rationale for developing subsequent composite score for participant-jurors’
perceptions of the expert. Perceptions of the defendant were assessed through
Hypothesis Testing Moderator Variables
A two way between–groups ANOVA was employed in order to explore the impact of
instruction and expert testimony on confidence in sentence recommendation. There was a
significant main affect of instructions: F (2,158) = 3.47, p = .03, partial eta squared = .04. Post
hoc comparisons using the Scheffé’s test indicated that the mean score for the catchall jury
instruction (M = -3.39, SD = 5.18) was significantly different from the specific jury instruction
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(M = -.40, SD = 6.40) suggesting that when participant-jurors were exposed to catchall
instructions they were more confident in a life verdict compared to specific instructions. The
revised instructions condition (M = -1.87, SD = 5.87) did not differ significantly from either of
the other groups. No significant main effect was found for the expert testimony. The interaction
between expert testimony and instructions was not significant.
Hypothesis Test Mitigating Circumstances
In order to test the importance of the non-statutory mitigating circumstances as a function
of our trial factors, a MANOVA was conducted. A MANOVA was determined the most
appropriate choice after considering increased likelihood of inflating Type I error given the
number of dependent measures (7) examined. The dependent measures included ratings of
importance of each non-statutory mitigator to verdict on a scale of 0 = 0% to 10 = 100%. The 7
non-statutory mitigating circumstances included: abuse, treatment, psychological disturbance,
remorse, no discipline issues, role model to his family, and the idea that he (the defendant) has
not lured any member of his family into trouble. Results indicated a main effect of both
instructions and expert testimony: For Instructions: Wilks” Lambda = .73; F(14, 296) = 3.65, p <
.001; ηp2 = .15: For Expert Testimony: Wilks’ Lambda = .70; F(7, 148) = 9.02, p < .001; ηp2 =
.30. A test of between-subjects effects found the main effect of instructions significant for all 7
non-statutory mitigating circumstances, p values ranged from < .001 to .004 . See Table 1 for
display of findings for instruction effects. A test of between-subjects effects for the main effect
of testimony also significant for all 7 non-statutory mitigating circumstances, p values ranged
from < .001 to .004. See Table 2 for display of findings for expert testimony effects. A
significant testimony * instruction was also observed: Wilks’ Lambda = .78; F(14, 296) = 2.82, p
= .001; ηp2 = .12. The interaction was found for the following non-statutory circumstances:
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treatment, remorse, and the idea that he has not lured any member of his family into trouble. See
Figures 1, 2, and 3 for a graphic depiction of each interaction effect. In each interaction affect,
the revised instruction revealed the greatest between-group differences, with the greatest
consideration given in the expert testimony present condition.
Hypothesis Predictive Ability of Measures
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of two control measures
(PANAS Positive, PANAS Negative) to predict confidence in sentence after controlling for the
influence of perceptions of the defendant, perceptions of the expert and age. Perceptions of the
defendant and perceptions of the expert were entered at Step 1, PANAS scales were entered at
Step 2, and age and gender were entered at Step 3. The first Model was not significant: p = .098,
indicating that perceptions of the expert and defendant did not significantly predict confidence in
sentence. However, at Step 2, the addition of mood found that perceptions of the defendant as
well as positive mood were significant, explaining 10% of the Model’s total variance of R =
.108: F(4, 149) = 4.48, p = .002. For perceptions (β = -.22, p = .009) revealing positive defendant
perceptions led to more confidence in a life sentence. For mood (β = .26, p = .002) indicating
that positive mood predicted higher levels of confidence in death sentence. After entering gender
and age at Step 3, the total variance explained by the Model was 14%: F(6, 147) = 4.04, p =
.001. The inclusion of gender added an additional 2% to the Model’s variance. Age was not
significant. In this Model, defendant perceptions and positive and negative mood were also
significant accounting for 13% of this Model’s significance (β = -.23, .28, and .21, respectively).
p values < .05.
Discussion
Instructions
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The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of a specific instruction designed
to guide jurors on non-statutory mitigating circumstances in determining sentence preference.
The effect of the expert testimony on childhood physical abuse as the main non-statutory
mitigating circumstance was also examined. Past research has consistently addressed the need
for mitigating instructions that would specifically and concretely enumerate non-statutory
mitigating circumstances in a way similar to the presentation of the aggravating ones. To date
there is no research examining whether specific instructions provide more guidance, and improve
juror discretion compared to the current general catchall instructions.
Specific instructions were developed under the rationale that mock jurors would attribute to
trial factors the mitigating power they deserve when those would be clearly and concretely
defined by the instructions. It was found that when participant-jurors were exposed to specific
non-statutory mitigating circumstances they were more confident in a death verdict compared to
the catchall instruction condition. The main effect of the instruction condition was predicted by
our first hypothesis, however, in the opposite direction under which specific instructions would
increase confidence in a life verdict.
A potential explanation for this contradictory finding is that even though the presence of
specific instructions as expected sifted participants’ attention towards specific negative events
those however, they were not treated as mitigating circumstances, as required under the law.
Perhaps instead of using that information to understand the contextual framework under which
the defendant committed the crime and as dictated by the mitigating instructions, they viewed
them as a “poor excuse” and justification for the commission of the crime. More specifically, the
event of a defendant’s childhood physical abuse may have cued jurors that he has been
permanently damaged, leading them to make more stable and internal attributions for the
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defendant causing a “backfire effect”. Even though Stalans and Henry (1994) found that on
average people allocate les punitive sentences to abused rather than non-abused offenders there
is a substantial amount of research (Brodsky, Adams, & Tupling, 2007, Barnett, Brodsky, &
Price, 2007, Garvey, 1998, Lynch & Haney, 2000) that has addressed the perils of the “backfire
effect” when jurors are confronted with evidence of defendant’s childhood physical or sexual
abuse.
An interesting aspect of the backfire event is that negative perceptions of the defendant are
accompanied by high emotionality, which has been found to be negatively correlated with
mechanisms of cognitive processing including attention, perception and recall (Kunha, 1999). In
the study conducted by Salerno and Bottoms (2009), the emotionality experienced by the
participant-jurors negatively impacted the quality of effortful cognitive processing of the
evidence and their ability to understand directions on how to apply those facts of the case
(mitigating vs. aggravating use). The backfire effect has also been seen in the literature
surrounding limited use evidence (Cox & Tanford, 1989) where jury eligible residents were
shown a videotape reenactment of civil negligence trial. Even though the presentation of limited
use evidence did not by itself had an effect on the judgments, significantly harsher judgments
occurred when the limited use evidence was accompanied by judicial admonitions to ignore it.
Similar findings were reported in the study of Broeder (1959) which found that mock jurors
awarded higher damages to a plaintiff after being instructed to disregard the information that the
defendant has insurance compared to the treatment where no instructions where given.
Consistent with previous findings, the current study found that an alarming percentage of
participant-jurors do not understand the burden of proof attached to the instructions. Only
slightly more than half our sample believed that aggravating circumstances should be proven
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beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigating circumstances should be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The burden of proof is the level of confidence needed to convict a defendant in a criminal
trial and is one of the most critical instructions provided to the jury. The concept of reasonable
doubt is often not defined by the court and in the current study researchers did not attempted to
define it in an effort to keep the external validity in satisfactory levels, and explore how the
mitigating instructions would be processed in the context of the general series of instructions.
The study treated instructions that pertain to the burden of proof the same across all treatments in
order to avoid a possible confounding variable while at the same maintaining a satisfactory level
of external validity by not compartmentalizing the pattern instructions.
When participants were exposed to specific instructions they reported that all seven nonstatutory mitigating factors in the case scenario significantly positively influenced their decision.
It appears that participants valued specific mitigating factors when presented with the revised
instructions. A possible interpretation is that the catchall instructions used a complicated
language (“any other circumstance, which extenuates the gravity of the crime though it is not a
legal excuse for the crime”) whereas specific instructions brought their attention to the negative
factors of the defendant’s life triggering a “backfire effect”. The revised instructions (“any other
circumstances, other than the ones I have already read to you, that make the crime seems less
serious, even though the circumstances are not a legal excuse. In this case do not limit yourself to
considering just the crime itself, but any circumstances of the defendant’s life”) provided more
concrete and simple language (the word extenuates is eliminated) and at the same time a more
neutral instructional context (absence of specific non-statutory mitigating circumstances).
The fact that under the presence of specific instructions and expert testimony participants
rated as more influential, factors unrelated to the effect of abuse is consistent with the “backfire
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effect” and explains why participants instead of rating as influential abuse related factors (abuse,
psychological disturbance) they focused on more neutral factors such as lack of treatment, that
the defendant has exhibited remorse and that he has not lured anyone else in the family into
trouble. Furthermore, the fact that all participants rated as influential the factor of remorse which
was however, depicted only in the specific instruction condition confirms previous findings
about the strong mitigating power of that factor (Garvey, 1998).
An interesting a question yielded by these findings is the following: If participants who were
exposed to our manipulations were significantly positively influenced by the aforementioned
nonstatutory mitigating factors, why did the specific instructions and the presence of expert
testimony fail to have a moderating effect in favor of confidence in a life verdict? A possible
explanation for that discrepancy is that while statutory mitigating factors, and statutory
aggravating factors were depicted throughout the trial script the aforementioned nonstatutory
evidence were only presented in the specific instruction and the expert testimony condition. That
fact may have resulted in the loss of their mitigating impact especially when those were
presented in the context of a robbery case (low severity case). Researchers in the present study
deliberately avoided distributing these non-statutory mitigating factors across the trial script in
order to avoid a confounding variable and at the same time increase confidence that possible
moderating effects of the instruction condition would be a product of participants being exposed
to specific instructions that entailed in detail those non-statutory mitigating circumstances.
Prior research has been controversial regarding the influence of expert testimony on mock
juror studies with some findings indicating that jurors tend to place great weight on scientific
expert testimony (Kovera et. al., 1997) while others suggesting that jurors may not have the
ability or the motivation to effectively evaluate evidence presented by the expert (Kovera,
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Russano, & McAuliff, 2002). In the current study the hypothesized main effect of the expert
testimony on childhood physical abuse was not confirmed. Interestingly however, the expert was
rated as credible and scientific. There are several possible explanations for the absence of a main
effect. First of all, the crime may not have been severe enough (robbery vs. sexual assault) for
the testimony to be able to have a moderating effect. Furthermore the central key of the
testimony (childhood physical abuse) may have not have been influential enough by itself in
order to reach an appropriate mitigating threshold. For instance testifying on the effects of sexual
childhood abuse might have been more persuasive for jurors who often have abusive histories in
their own lives and yet lack of criminal behavior. Overall, the literature suggests that the most
persuasive mitigators are those related to mental retardation, and mental illnesses (Barnet et al,
2004). Finally even though the expert in the case provided a detailed history of the defendant’s
life and attempted to tie all the evidence together and establish a link between the defendant’s
criminality and history of physical childhood abuse, it may have failed to do so effectively.
Study Limitations
As with many experimental studies on juror decision-making the current study also suffers
from limitations of the external and ecological validity. The testimony in the present study was
conveyed through a written transcript which is not representative of actual jury trial. However,
research reports very little difference in the type of medium chosen for stimulus materials
(Bornstein, 1999; Rose & Ogloff, 2001). Among other threats are the absence of the guilt phase
of the trial before the sentencing hearing, the absence of past violent history in the aggravating
factors, the use of one particular capital sentencing case (robbery), the lack of deliberation
condition and the brevity of the sentencing hearing itself which lasted approximately one hour,
did not include victim impact testimony, or testimony from defendants familial environment.
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Even though in the absence of victim impact evidence mock jurors are more punitive when they
hear a victim impact statement in the context of a robbery and assault case (Tsoudis & Smith –
Lovin, 1998), in the current study it was purposefully omitted for the sake of protecting the
study’s internal validity. More specifically victim impact statement in the current design would
be a confounding variable in the treatments where no expert testimony would exist to
counterbalance its effects. Another important threat to the ecological validity is that mock jurors
may not pay as close attention to judicial instructions as actual jurors due to the lack of
consequence (i.e. no one dies). Reifman et al, (1992) suggested that the findings of empirical
studies of instructional comprehension are overall representative of actual juror comprehension.
In the present study in order to minimize perils related to the lack of participant attention, two
manipulation checks were included that aimed to control for the central non-statutory mitigating
circumstance and the presence of the expert witness. Participant-jurors in the present study
responded positively to the aforementioned manipulation checks indicating that for the most part
they actively paid attention to the trial factors.
Future Directions and Conclusions
Even after taking into account the weakness in the research design, this study’s empirical
findings do have several important policy implications that require further empirical exploration.
According to Luginbuhl & Middendorf (1988) the more strongly opposed an individual was to
the death penalty the more likely he or she was to endorse mitigating circumstances. Along the
same lines, Blankenship and Luginbuhl (1994) indicated that mock jurors who showed the
greatest comprehension of penalty phase instructions especially with regard to mitigating
instructions, would have been ineligible to serve on jury because they were not “death qualified”.
That said it would be interesting to see if those differences would exist when comparing

CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE

32

participant-jurors’ reactions towards catchall versus specific mitigating instructions, since
findings from the current study are solely a product of death eligible participant-jurors. What
affects people’s motivation to evaluate scientific testimony is their need for cognition “tendency
to engage on and enjoy in effortful cognitive activity” (Cacioppo et al., 1984) which makes them
more likely to systematically process complex concepts. In the current study we did not explore
the participant-jurors’ “need for cognition” in relation to their receptiveness of the expert
testimony, and for future reference it would be interesting to explore that correlation and possible
variations in the ability of the “need for condition” to predict efficacy of differential types of
testimony (physical abuse vs. witnessing abuse vs. drug abuse). Furthermore future research that
would examine the superiority of specific over catchall instructions under different capital
criminal cases (robbery, robbery with violence, physical assault, sexual assault) and under
different content of the expert testimony (childhood physical abuse vs. sexual abuse) would shed
more light in the current findings and contribute in making more generalized and confident
statements about the superiority of the catchall over specific mitigating instructions.
Even in the context of specific and concrete written non-statutory mitigating circumstances
mock jurors failed to understand the law because of the content, process and bias on their own
information applying “commonsense justice” which is related to the “intuitive notions jurors
bring with them to the jury box when judging both a defendant and the law” (Diamond 1993,
Finkel, 1995). This seems to be the case even in light of the psychosocial literature, which
suggests that in the absence of clear and accessible information decision makers are more
influenced by irrelevant peripheral cues and more likely to fall back on simple judgment
heuristics (Chaiken, 1987) the current study revealed that even in the presence of complete
accounts of the causes of the capital crime, clarification of the role of social contextual
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influences in the capital crime and concrete and specific mitigating instructions mock jurors are
prone to similar biases. Expert witnesses and defense attorneys should be very careful in not
cuing jurors in defendant’s negative life events without providing a contextual framework, and
even in the presence of a comprehensive social history “more” is not necessarily better. We run
the risk that a juror’s attention is focused on negative events; consequently, other important
mitigating information is discarded. Finally, since mitigation is designed to protect the defendant
from the ultimate penalty of death, it is essential for capital jurors to understand concepts of
mitigation in order for the defendant to have a fair impartial and constitutionally appropriate
trial.
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Appendix
Informed Consent Form
Principal Investigators: Fotine Konstantopoulou and Judith Platania, Ph.D.
Purpose of the Study: This study will examine jurors’ perceptions of the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. A minimum of 120 participant-jurors will be included in this study.
Procedures Experienced by Participant-jurors: By participating in this study, you will be
asked to review a segment of testimony in a death penalty case. You will fill out a questionnaire
regarding aspects of a trial. Participation should take approximately 30 minutes.
Confidentiality and Anonymity: Only the investigators will have access to your responses,
which will ensure your confidentiality. Additionally, your signature will only appear on your
consent form, which is archived electronically. Thus, your responses will remain anonymous.
Your Rights: You have the right to decline participation without any penalties or prejudice
because participation is strictly voluntary. Additionally, at any point in the study if you do not
feel comfortable or no longer want to participate, you have the right to withdraw from the study
without prejudice or penalty. You may contact the primary investigator at any time after you
have participated in the study and if requested the results of the experiment will be made
available to you.
Compensation for Participation: You will receive a $5 incentive for completing this survey.
Risks and Benefits of being a Participant: No physical, psychological, or emotional risks are
associated with this study. At any time during your participation, you are allowed to withdraw
from this study without facing any penalties. A potential benefit is that you might have a better
understanding of how psychological research is conducted. Your participation to this study is
very important and greatly appreciated.
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More Information: After participation, please feel free to contact Dr. Judith Platania in FCAS
104, by email at jplatania@rwu.edu, or telephone 401 254-5738 should you have any additional
questions. By linking to the study, I certify that I have given my full consent to participate in this
study. I am at least 18 years of age or older. I have read this form and fully understand the
content.
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Appendix B
Pre-Trial Materials
(All participant-jurors will read this summary and render a verdict)
JUDGE: Ladies and Gentlemen, the defendant in this case, John Andrews is being charged with
attempted armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and the firstdegree murder of Tom Allen. The evidence established that Andrews entered the grocery store
on a Saturday night and tied up the victim, Tom Allen at gunpoint. While the defendant was
emptying the store shelves, the victim freed himself and began running toward the door. The
defendant, Andrews yelled for him to stop and when he didn’t he shot and killed him. The events
of the crime were captured by the store’s surveillance camera.
As a result of reading the facts of the case, do you find John Andrews guilty or not guilty of the
murder of Tom Allen:
 Not Guilty

[1]

 Guilty

[2]
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Pre-Trial Jury Instruction
(all participant-jurors will read this death-qualification instruction)
JUDGE: Ladies and Gentlemen, as a juror in the sentencing phase of the capital trial of John
Andrews, you will hear evidence from both the Prosecution and the Defense. After you have
heard evidence from each side, you will be asked to recommend a sentence of either life in
prison without parole, or death by lethal injection. “Murder” is the killing of any person with
malice aforethought, either express or implied. When the State seeks the death penalty, upon
conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, the court shall conduct a separate
sentencing proceeding. A separate sentencing proceeding is conducted to determine whether
sentence should be death or life imprisonment. The Prosecution and the defense are permitted to
present arguments for or against the sentence to be imposed. At the close of this proceeding, I
will instruct you on the law in this case.

Do you feel that your views on the death penalty, either in favor or opposed, would prevent or
substantially impair you from considering both penalties in this case? (Life in prison vs. death
penalty)

 No

[1]

 Yes

[2]

If respondent indicates Not Guilty and Yes, he/she will be thanked for their participation and
awarded the $5 research incentive. They will not move to the next phase of the study.
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Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. Your responses are important to our
research. Please answer every question on this form by placing a check in the box that
corresponds to the appropriate response.
Your gender:
 Male
 Female

[1]
[2]

Into which of the following age categories do you fall:







18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 or older

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]

Which of the following characterizes your background?





Caucasian
Hispanic
African-American
Other

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

What is your religious affiliation?






Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Muslim
Other

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

Your marital status:






Single
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
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How would you evaluate your political views?





Liberal
Slightly Liberal
Slightly Conservative
Conservative

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

Do you have a valid driver’s license?
 No
 Yes

[1]
[2]

Are you a registered voter?
 No
 Yes

[1]
[2]

Have you ever served on a jury?
 No
 Yes

[1]
[2]

What is your employment status? (Only check one)







Not working now/unemployed
Retired
Student
Homemaker
Employed full-time
Employed part-time

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]

What is the highest year of education you have attained?







Less than high school
Attended some high school
High school diploma
Partial college or junior college
College degree
Post-graduate college degree

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
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Which of the following best describes your view regarding the death penalty:





Appropriate in all cases where someone has been murdered.
Generally appropriate with very few exceptions.
Generally opposed with very few exceptions.
Opposed in every possible case where someone has been murdered.

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to record your
answers:

1
very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

______attentive

______ strong

______ irritable

______ inspired

______ afraid

______ alert

______ upset

______ active

______ guilty

______ nervous

______ excited

______ hostile

______ proud

______ jittery

______ ashamed

______ scared

______ enthusiastic

______ distressed

______ determined

______ interested

5
extremely
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Appendix C
Case Materials
(all participant-jurors read this pre-trial instruction)
JUDGE: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you have just convicted the defendant, John
Andrews for attempted armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a
violent crime and the first-degree murder of Tom Allen. The evidence established that that
Andrews entered the grocery store on a Saturday night and tied up the victim, Tom Allen at
gunpoint. While the defendant was emptying the store shelves, the victim freed himself and
began running toward the door. The defendant, Andrews yelled for him to stop and when he
didn’t, he shot and killed him.
It is your duty now to decide upon the appropriate sentence for the defendant, John
Andrews. The sentencing decision before you is certainly a difficult one; you must determine
which penalty is the appropriate sentence for this crime: life imprisonment without parole, or the
death penalty by lethal injection. This decision must be based upon the careful consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There are two aggravating circumstances in this case
and those are that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and that the victim was
killed in the course of a robbery with a deadly weapon. In determining which penalty is
appropriate for John Andrews, you are permitted any aspect of the defendant, or his background.
I trust that after hearing the evidence presented today, you will come to the appropriate sentence.
The prosecution and the defense will now present their cases. The prosecutor will argue
that you should vote for the death penalty and the defense attorney will argue for mercy, asking
you to spare the defendant’s life. Finally, I will be providing you with sentencing instructions in
this matter.
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Opening Statements
Prosecution
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury you have read the fact pattern that detailed how John Andrews
cut Tom Allen’s life short. The law in this state dictates that I this case, first-degree murder
occurs when someone takes the life of another human being through a premeditated and
intentional act, and the punishment for first-degree murder is death by lethal injection. While
certain circumstances in an individual’s life can bring forward sympathy, they certainly cannot
explain or excuse taking another person’s life. You should hold the defendant solely accountable
for the commission of this extreme act of violence. It’s not my purpose or intent to arouse you or
cause you to make a decision based upon anything other than what is reasonable and what is
required under the law and the evidence. I trust that after hearing the evidence presented today,
you will come to the appropriate sentence – death by lethal injection.
Defense
Members of the jury, now you must consider the larger picture of the defendant’s life as you
decide the most extraordinary and extreme punishments – life in prison or death by lethal
injection. The fact of his conviction for murder is not enough; you still have to consider whether
this person is so beyond redemption that he should be eliminated from the human community.
After all, he was 19 years old when he committed this crime and he did not have a significant
prior history of other criminal activity. The defendant has hurt many individuals through this
heinous act, however in determining which penalty is appropriate for John Andrews, you are
permitted to identify any aspect of the defendant, or his background, which may lead you to
recommend a sentence of life imprisonment. I am confident that the testimony presented today
will lead you to recommend the appropriate sentence - life imprisonment without parole.
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Testimony of Expert Witness
(Experimental Condition: Present)
JUDGE: Is the defense attorney prepared to present the first witness?
D (Defense Attorney): I am, your honor.
JUDGE: Please proceed.
D: Please state your name for the court.
E (Expert Witness): My name is Dr. Tyler Smith.
D: Dr. Smith, would you please state your credentials for the court?
E: Certainly, I have earned my undergraduate degree in Psychology at Brown University in 1987
and earned a Ph. D in Clinical Forensic Psychology at John Jay University in 1993. I completed
my post-doctoral work at a major research university in New York City. I have been a consultant
to a wide range of organizations including the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse, the
U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, and the FBI. I teach at a local university and
continue to conduct research on the long-term effects of childhood abuse in adulthood and its
connection to delinquency. I have written and contributed to dozens of articles and books on
childhood maltreatment and delinquent behavior as also protective and aggravating factors along
the developmental course.
D: Have you ever testified as an expert witness before?
E: I have on numerous occasions. I have served as an expert witness involving issues of trauma,
violence and abuse in both civil and criminal trials.
D: How many of these assessments for the court have you conducted?
E: In this state?
D: Yes.
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E: I have been conducting assessments for the courts in this state for the past seven years.
Starting in 2001, I would estimate that I have conducted between eighty to one-hundred of these
assessments.
D: Have you conducted an assessment of the defendant?
E: Yes, I have.
D: What form of assessments did you conduct?
E: I have reviewed his records, and have contacted, met, and obtained information from family
members. I have also met twice with the defendant.
D: Please describe to the court what you did exactly.
E. I reviewed all of Mr. Andrews’ records including criminal and medical records, school
records, military records, juvenile court records and prison records. I have talked to his sisters
who are currently located out of state and I have met him twice at the prison for two hours each
time.
D: What can you tell us about Mr. Andrews?
E: John Andrews was subject to persistent and brutal abuse throughout his childhood. He grew
up in the absent of a nurturing environment, around explosive tempers who then became a model
for him on how to behave.
D: Can you tell us as a professional what are the long-term effects of childhood physical abuse?
E: Literature suggests that among the damaging results of childhood physical abuse is a chronic
inability to regulate emotions, behaviors and impulses, aggression against one’s self or others.
The ability to understand one’s own behavior and to understand how inappropriate their
responses are to this behavior is quite limited.
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D: Dr. Taylor are you saying in your professional opinion that there is a direct causal connection
between child abuse and aggressive behaviors?
E: Yes I think that that is well established. The experience of being abused produces fear, anxiety
and anger. It produces difficulty in relating to other people. It isolates the person from his peers
and from other adults, and those kinds of feelings and social skills tend to lead a child into an
escalating pattern of delinquent behavior.
D: What can you tell us about how the experience of childhood abuse has affected the defendant?
E: I believe that the experience of physical abuse has psychologically damaged Mr. Andrews,
who does not possesses the normal capacity to make accurate judgments, control his behavior or
understand the consequences of his actions. The fact that these impairments may become more
pronounced or debilitating in stressful situations could certainly play a role in circumstances that
ended in murder.
D: Dr. Taylor can you explain for us in more detail how those childhood experiences influenced
the course of his act?
E: The record indicates that the defendant’s father was an alcoholic and abusive towards the
family and especially the defendant. His mother worked constantly to keep her children and
herself off of welfare. The defendant’s father would come home drunk, and when upset he would
take Andrews in a room, lock the door and he would beat him with belts, extension cords, coat
hangers or whatever he could get his hands on. The defendant’s sister used to come home and
hear Andrews screaming. When the beating was done Andrews would come out of the room with
his back bloody from the beatings. Such beatings were a daily event for five consecutive years.
This continued until the Child Protective Custody Office removed the defendant from his natural
family at the age of twelve. From that time the defendant has been in and out of foster homes and
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since then he has changed six foster homes. Until now he has maintained contact with relatives
and in his relationship with them he is considerate, generous and concerned. The defendant has
not lured anyone else in his family into trouble with the law; he has actually discouraged family
members from engaging in criminal behaviors and used himself as an example why they should
not get involved in criminal activity. In spite of his personal problems the defendant has
encouraged his cousins to do well and has been a mentor and a role model of integrity to his
relatives. The defendant has been in state institutions but had never received any real help or
treatment of his problems. At the time of the murder Andrews was under stress, suffered from an
emotional and mental disturbance and possessed an impaired ability to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.
D: Dr. Taylor, according to your professional opinion, does John Andrews possess a continuous
threat to the prison community if sentenced to life in prison?
E: I am confident that the defendant will benefit from therapeutic groups within the facility such
as anger management, social skills and life skills groups and with support and professional help
he can be a productive member of the facility.
D: No further questions.
Cross-Examination of the Expert Witness
JUDGE: Is the prosecutor prepared with cross-examination of this witness?
P (Prosecutor): Yes your Honor, I am prepared to move forward.
JUDGE: Proceed.
P: Dr. Is it true that most of the literature which examines the long term effects of childhood
abuse throughout adulthood suffers from a variety of methodological problems such as lack of
appropriated comparison groups and reliance on correlational studies?
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E: Yes that has been addressed. There are many intervening factors between the event of
childhood abuse and the present day that it makes it challenging to isolate only the factors related
to the abuse.
P: Do you believe that we have the capacity to choose right from wrong?
E: Yes that can happen if one has a nurturing environment that would support that capacity and
allowed it to be used.
P: How do you explain why some people who come from bad homes do well in life?
E: We all have different innate endowments and ability to tolerate frustration. One can’t just look
at people and know who will turn out good and who will turn out bad. Along the same lines we
have seen people who have been brought up in good families but have turned out making bad
choices with their lives. You have to look carefully at the environment and especially the family
dynamics.
P: How would you explain that the defendant’s sisters have lead a productive life even though
they were brought up in the same dysfunctional environment?
E: As I mentioned before our tolerance to frustration is different. Additionally, different ages,
gender and stages of development may have lessened the consequences of trauma for them, since
the different stages create different experiences of abuse and different perceptions of options
available on how to react. Possible explanations for why they may not have been as traumatized
by the abuse as the defendant has, are age, personality characteristics, and critical moments of
good fortune.
P: Are you saying that people are not responsible for what they do?
E: What John Andrews did was the product of the interaction between himself and his
environment.
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P: So was the defendant’s childhood abuse the cornerstone of Chronic Anger Syndrome? Was
violence inevitable?
E: He had no way of expressing what was happening to him. His feelings were just festering
inside him. He could have learned to channel those feelings and the violence if he had gotten
help. Events in his childhood caused problems that he needed professional help that he never
received.
P: Whose fault is it that Andrews committed the robbery?
E: He would have to take responsibility for that.
P: And for all his other voluntary acts?
E: He would be responsible.
P: No further questions.
Closing Argument - Prosecutor
May it please the Court, and you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is the last stage of the
trial, but, this is an important part of the trial, just as important as the guilt or innocence stage of
the trial, and we ask you to treat it as such. The purpose of punishment is to punish the guilty
offender. Punishment is supposed to be adequate and appropriate. Now let’s talk a minute about
the circumstances of this crime. Tom Allen, the victim in this case, gets his regular morning
coffee and was starting another day at work, at the convenience store. That morning the
defendant entered the store robbed the victim and ended his life. This was a senseless crime, a
crime that never should have happened. What makes this crime so horrible is its randomness.
There was nothing Tom Allen could do about this. The defendant was targeting someone that
day, it just happened to be Tom Allen. There are two aggravating circumstances in this case: (a)
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, (b) the victim was killed in the course of a
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robbery with a deadly weapon. In determining which penalty is appropriate for John Andrews, I
trust you will apply those aggravating circumstances and sentence this defendant to death.
Closing Argument - Defense
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I would like to point out that no matter what sentence you
impose your decision will not bring back Tom Allen. You have to consider whether the
defendant is so beyond redemption that he should be eliminated from the human community.
Remember that life in prison has virtually the same outcome as the death penalty for the family
of Allen’s. Either outcome will not bring him back. Therefore, I submit to you that no good can
come from a verdict for death. John Andrews will never be released from prison and therefore
could never kill again. He is responsible for what he did although he was 19 years old at the time
of the crime. That’s why we are here, at the point of sentencing. Mitigating evidence is offered to
help you understand what he did, not to excuse or justify it. There are two mitigating
circumstances in this case: (a) the defendant was 19 years old when he committed this crime, b)
The defendant did not have a significant prior history of other criminal activity. In determining
which penalty is appropriate for John Andrews, I trust you will apply those mitigating
circumstances and sentence this defendant to life imprisonment without parole.
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Judge’s Instructions Manipulation
Catchall Instruction Condition
You must decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life in prison without the
possibility of parole. In reaching your decision, consider all of the evidence. Do not allow bias,
prejudice, or public opinion to influence your opinion in any way. In reaching your decision, you
must consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or factors shown by the
evidence. An aggravating circumstance is any fact, condition, or event relating to the
commission of a crime, above and beyond the elements of the crime itself that increases the
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, the enormity of the offense, or the harmful impact of
the crime. An aggravating circumstance may support a decision to impose the death penalty. A
mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition, or event that makes the death penalty less
appropriate as a punishment, even though it does not legally justify or excuse the crime. A
mitigating circumstance is something that reduces the defendant’s blameworthiness or otherwise
supports a less severe punishment. A mitigating circumstance may support a decision not to
impose the death penalty.
Aggravating factors include: (a) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, (b) The
capital offense was committed during the commission of a specific felony (robbery).
Among the mitigating circumstances you are allowed to consider include: (a) The
defendant’s age at the time of the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case, (b)
The defendant did not have a significant prior history of other criminal activity, (c)Any
other circumstance, which extenuates the gravity of the crime though it is not a legal excuse
for the crime.
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You must decide whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist. Each aggravating circumstance
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are reasonably convinced that mitigating
circumstances exist you may consider it as established. Determine which penalty is appropriate
and justified by considering all the evidence and the totality of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Even without mitigating circumstances, you may decide that the aggravating
circumstances are not substantial enough to warrant death. To return a judgment of death, each
of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances both outweigh the mitigating
circumstances and are also so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that a
sentence of death is appropriate and justified.
Revised Instruction Condition
You must decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life in prison without the
possibility of parole. In reaching your decision, consider all of the evidence. Do not allow bias,
prejudice, or public opinion to influence your opinion in any way. In reaching your decision, you
must consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or factors shown by the
evidence. An aggravating circumstance is any fact, condition, or event relating to the
commission of a crime, above and beyond the elements of the crime itself that increases the
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, the enormity of the offense, or the harmful impact of
the crime. An aggravating circumstance may support a decision to impose the death penalty. A
mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition, or event that makes the death penalty less
appropriate as a punishment, even though it does not legally justify or excuse the crime. A
mitigating circumstance is something that reduces the defendant’s blameworthiness or otherwise
supports a less severe punishment. A mitigating circumstance may support a decision not to
impose the death penalty. Aggravating factors include: (a) The murder was especially heinous,
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atrocious, or cruel, (b) The capital offense was committed during the commission of a specific
felony (robbery).
Among the mitigating circumstances you are allowed to consider include: (a) The defendant’s
age at the time of the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case, (b) The defendant
did not have a significant prior history of other criminal activity, (c) Any other circumstances,
other than the ones I have already read to you, that make the crime seems less serious, even
though the circumstances are not a legal excuse. In this case do not limit yourself to
considering just the crime itself, but any circumstances of the defendant’s life.
You must decide whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist. Each aggravating circumstance
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are reasonably convinced that mitigating
circumstances exist you may consider it as established. Determine which penalty is appropriate
and justified by considering all the evidence and the totality of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Even without mitigating circumstances, you may decide that the aggravating
circumstances are not substantial enough to warrant death. To return a judgment of death, each
of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances both outweigh the mitigating
circumstances and are also so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that a
sentence of death is appropriate and justified.
Specific Instruction Condition
You must decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life in prison without the
possibility of parole. In reaching your decision, consider all of the evidence. Do not allow bias,
prejudice, or public opinion to influence your opinion in any way. In reaching your decision, you
must consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or factors shown by the
evidence. An aggravating circumstance is any fact, condition, or event relating to the

CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE

63

commission of a crime, above and beyond the elements of the crime itself that increases the
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, the enormity of the offense, or the harmful impact of
the crime. An aggravating circumstance may support a decision to impose the death penalty. A
mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition, or event that makes the death penalty less
appropriate as a punishment, even though it does not legally justify or excuse the crime. A
mitigating circumstance is something that reduces the defendant’s blameworthiness or otherwise
supports a less severe punishment. A mitigating circumstance may support a decision not to
impose the death penalty.
Aggravating factors include: (a) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, (b) The
capital offense was committed during the commission of a specific felony (robbery).
Among the mitigating circumstances you are allowed to consider include: (a) The
defendant’s age at the time of the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case, (b)
The defendant did not have a significant prior history of other criminal activity, (c) Any
aspect of the defendant’s character or record or background, any other circumstances of
the offense offered as a basis for a sentence less than death including but not limited to: (1)
Andrews was severely physically abused by his father during childhood (2) Andrews has been in
state institutions but had never received any real help or treatment of his problems, (3) Andrews
current psychological disturbances are related to the abuse he experienced as a child , (4)
Andrews displayed appropriate remorse and genuine concern for the distress caused to his family
and the victims family (5) Andrew’s has not been a discipline problem either in prison or in the
pretrial detention facility for the period of his recent incarceration, (6) Andrews has not lured
anyone else in his family into trouble with the law, he has actually discouraged family members
from engaging in criminal behaviors and used himself as an example, and (7) in spite of his
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personal problems Andrews has encouraged his cousins to do well and has been a mentor and a
role model of integrity to his relatives.
You must decide whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist. Each aggravating circumstance
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are reasonably convinced that mitigating
circumstances exist you may consider it as established. Determine which penalty is appropriate
and justified by considering all the evidence and the totality of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Even without mitigating circumstances, you may decide that the aggravating
circumstances are not substantial enough to warrant death. To return a judgment of death, each
of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances both outweigh the mitigating
circumstances and are also so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that a
sentence of death is appropriate and justified.
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Appendix D
Post-Trial Questionnaire
Please place a check in the box that corresponds with your response.
Please recommend a sentence for the defendant in this case.
 Life in prison

[1]

 Death by lethal injection

[2]

Please circle the number that corresponds most closely to how you feel.
How confident are you of your sentencing recommendation?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all confident

8
Completely confident

Using the following scale, please circle the number that reflects your opinion of how credible the
expert testimony was in this case:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all credible

8
Completely credible

Using the following scale, please circle the number that reflects your opinion of how scientific
the expert testimony was in this case:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all scientific

8
Completely scientific

Using the following scale, please circle the number that reflects your opinion of how important
the expert testimony was to this case:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all important

8
Completely important

Based on the testimony, how troubled was the defendant’s life?
1

2

Not at all troubled

3

4

5

6

7

8
Completely troubled
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Based on the testimony, to what extent do you believe the victim’s death was a unique loss to his
family?
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

6

7

8
A great deal

Please indicate on a scale of 0% to 100%, the extent to which each of the following factors
influenced your sentencing decision. They do not need to add to 100%.
His father severely physically abused the defendant during childhood.
_______%
The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.
_______%
The defendant has never received any real treatment for his problems.
_______%
The defendant’s psychological disturbances are related to the abuse he experienced as a child.
_______%
The defendant has displayed appropriate remorse and genuine concern for the pain he caused.
_______%
The defendant has not been a discipline problem during the period of his recent incarceration.
_______%
The defendant has not lured anyone else in his family into trouble with the law.
_______%
The defendant has encouraged his cousins to do well and has become a role model to his
relatives.
_______%
The defendant’s age at the time of the offense.
_______%
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The defendant did not have a significant prior history of other criminal activity
_______%

This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to record your
answers:
1
very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

______attentive

______ strong

______ irritable

______ inspired

______ afraid

______ alert

______ upset

______ active

______ guilty

______ nervous

______ excited

______ hostile

______ proud

______ jittery

______ ashamed

______ scared

______ enthusiastic

______ distressed

______ determined

______ interested

The defendant in this case was





Physically abused throughout childhood
Sexually abused throughout childhood
The witness of physical abuse throughout childhood
None of the above

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

5
extremely
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In order to consider a factor in favor of a death sentence it must be proven




beyond a reasonable doubt
by a preponderance of the evidence
only to a juror’s personal satisfaction

[1]
[2]
[3]

In order to consider a factor in favor of a life sentence it must be proven




beyond a reasonable doubt
by a preponderance of the evidence
only to a juror’s personal satisfaction

[1]
[2]
[3]

In this case, you heard evidence presented by an expert witness:
 No
 Yes

[1]
[2]

How seriously did you take your role as a juror in this case?
1
Not at all serious

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Completely serious
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Appendix E
Debriefing
We appreciate your participation in our study on juror perceptions. The responses you provided
will be used to examine effects of testimony regarding evidence of physical abuse on sentencing
verdicts. For addition information about confession evidence, the following is an excellent
resource:
Stevenson, M. C., Bottoms, B. L., & Diamond, S. S. (2010). Jurors’ discussions of a defendant’s
history of child abuse and alcohol abuse in capital sentencing deliberations. Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law, 16, 1-38.

If you have any concerns regarding this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Judith Platania in
the Feinstein College of Arts and Sciences Building Office 104, via e-mail at jplatania@rwu.edu
or at 401-254-5738. Thank you for your participation. *If you are experiencing stress and need
assistance, please contact the Roger Williams University Counseling Center at (401) 254-3124.
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Current Study:

Catchall Instruction

Revised Instruction

Specific Instruction

CI /ET

RI /ET

SI / ET

CI / No – ET *

RI/No – ET

SI/No –ET

Expert Testimony
Present (ET)
Expert Testimony
Absent (ET)

* Control Condition
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Table 1.
Post Hoc Differences on Type of Instruction for Non-Statutory Mitigating Circumstances
______________________________________________________________________________
Catchall

Revised

Specific

The defendant . . .
suffered severe physical abuse during his childhood.

39%a

49%ab

60%b

never received treatment for his problems.

38%a

50%ab

62%b

psychological disturbances are related to abuse.

40%a

58%b

60%b

has displayed appropriate remorse.

32%a

53%b

57%b

hasn’t been a discipline problem while incarcerated.

37%a

51%b

60%b

hasn’t lured family members into crime.

36%a

53%b

59%b
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has been a role model to his cousins.
34%a
53%b
58%b
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Percentages sharing superscripts do not differ significantly at p < .05. Instructions
indicated that totals did not need to equal 100%. N = 52 – 55 per experimental condition.
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Table 2.
Post Hoc Differences on Type of Instruction for Non-Statutory Mitigating Circumstances
______________________________________________________________________________
Expert Testimony Present

Absent

The defendant . . .
suffered severe physical abuse during his childhood.

62%

33%

never received treatment for his problems.

61%

37%

psychological disturbances are related to abuse.

67%

37%

has displayed appropriate remorse.

54%

38%

hasn’t been a discipline problem while incarcerated.

55%

41%

hasn’t lured family members into crime.

58%

36%

has been a role model to his cousins.
58%
35%
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Instructions indicated that totals did not need to equal 100%: p < .05.
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Figure 1.
Expert Testimony x Judge’s Instructions on Non
Non-Statutory
Statutory Circumstance of treatment.
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Figure 2.
Expert Testimony x Judge’s Instructions on Non
Non-Statutory
Statutory Circumstance of Remorse
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Figure 3.
Expert Testimony x Judge’s Instructions Interaction on Non
Non-Statutory
Statutory Circumstance of lure
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